what the psychologists can teach the politicians.

One of the most illuminating articles about Russian foreign policy I ever read said nothing about Russian foreign policy.

"In times of conflict and tension," wrote Jonathan Renshon and Daniel Kahneman in a 2007 issue of Foreign Policy magazine, much depends on how each side perceives the other.

If the opponent is seen to be an unremittingly hostile regime that only understands the language of force, you had better speak that language. No concessions. No negotiation. Take a hard line -- and back it up with the threat of serious sanctions, including military action.

Is this wise? It depends. In some cases, the hawks may be right. They certainly were about Hitler, as hawks have repeated ever since.

But cognitive psychologists have demonstrated conclusively that human perceptions are profoundly and predictably biased in many ways. (Much of this work was done by Kahneman, a legendary Princeton psychologist and winner of the Nobel Prize in economics.) Applying these insights to the high-stakes world of international conflict, Renshon and Kahneman concluded we are irrationally inclined to hawkish conclusions.

One of the key biases at work is what psychologists call the "fundamental attribution error." Despite the grand name, the idea is very simple: When we look at our own behaviour, we take into account the circumstances which may influence our actions; but when we observe other people's behaviour, we ignore the influence of circumstances and instead see their actions as simple reflections of character.

I snapped at my wife because I'm exhausted and under a lot of pressure; you snapped at your wife because you're a rotten husband. I was speeding because I had urgent business I had to get to; you were speeding because you are a jerk who doesn't care about the safety of others. I lied because the truth would hurt innocent people; you lied because you are a liar.
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In one of the first studies of this bias, researchers asked people to read short essays. Half the essays defended the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro. The other half denounced it. Participants were also told that the authors did not choose to write a pro- or anti-Castro essay. Instead, they were randomly assigned a position.

Now, the researchers asked, please judge the author's true feelings about Castro's Cuba.

The fact that the views expressed in the essays weren't freely chosen mattered little. Authors who had written pro-Castro essays tended to be judged pro-Castro, while those who had written anti-Castro essays were deemed anti-Castro.

"Even when people are aware of the context and possible constraints on another party's behaviour, they often do not factor it in when assessing the other side's motives. Yet, people still assume that outside observers grasp the constraints on their own behaviour," Renshon and Kahneman summarize. "With armies on high alert, it's an instinct that leaders can ill afford to ignore."

But leaders do ignore this bias. So do analysts, pundits and most others who know nothing about cognitive psychology.

To see the results, have a look at Western portrayals of Russia's invasion of Georgia and other Russian moves over the last several years.

Overwhelmingly, Russia is portrayed as confident, even arrogant. Flush with oil money, once again authoritarian, Russia is its old self: aggressive, hostile, imperial.

How do we know this is true? Just look at Russia's aggressive, hostile, imperial actions. The possibility that the actions may be the product of circumstances is scarcely considered. Instead, actions indicate character. And the character they indicate is scary.

And so we are told that we are faced with a hostile regime that only understands the language of force. A hawkish response is vital.
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Naturally, it helps that this is a reprise of Cold War roles. We are all too comfortable imagining Russia as a surly, savage bear.

But a great many thoughtful observers of Russia warn that this whole line of thinking is based on a serious mistake.

"It would be easy to assume Russia is simply grasping power for power's sake, or to conclude that just as there are no ex-KGB officer there are also no ex-imperial powers," writes Ivan Krastev, author of The Post Cold War European Order. "But to understand why the Kremlin acts the way it does, one must first recognize how haunted it is by uncertainty and paranoia.

"Moscow's current strategy is not merely a reflection of its new power or a geopolitical change. It is the expression of the traumatic experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the omnipresent political vulnerability of the current regime."

Russia is hardly the fully restored giant of neo-con imagination. Even as Moscow and St. Petersburg boom with oil money, decay and depopulation continue across broad swathes of the country. The government's challenges are profound.

And what does this hard-pressed, anxious regime see beyond its borders? NATO expanding rapidly. American military bases and advisers everywhere from Uzbekistan to the Baltic. American support toppling undemocratic regimes in Georgia and Ukraine. American missiles soon to be based in Poland. American politicians and pundits once again describing Russia as the enemy.

Whether the Putin regime is right to feel encircled and vulnerable is entirely beside the point. In politics, perception is reality.

And perception is a matter of cognitive psychology.

Here's hoping politicians and pundits learn something about the subject.

You can contact Dan Gardner at the Ottawa Citizen.
E-mail: dgardner@thecitizen.canwest.com

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