Cold War caricatures don't tell the story.

As Russian tanks rumbled through Georgia, leaving a swath of destruction, the western media hurriedly dug up background information for a public that -- let's be honest -- was not entirely aware that Georgia is something other than the home of the Atlanta Braves.

One historical tidbit appeared repeatedly: Georgia had been forced into the Russian empire in the 19th century but in 1918, with Russia embroiled in civil war, Georgians bravely threw off their shackles. Independence lasted until 1921, when a Bolshevik army invaded and dragged this proud people back into a Russian-dominated empire.

In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia once more tasted freedom. But now, the Russians were yet again on the march.

History seldom offers such neat parallels. Or such tidy morality plays. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Russia is incorrigible.

But neat parallels and tidy morality tales are almost invariably neat and tidy because messy details have been left out. And so it was with the story of Georgia's first, tragic, bid for freedom.

Following the declaration of independence in 1918, the first shots Georgians fired weren't at Russians. They were at Armenians, in a squalid little war fought over obscure scraps of land.

The Caucasus -- a mountainous region not much bigger than England and Wales -- is home to some 40 languages. The ethnic mix is bewilderingly complex.

And borders? For 2,000 years, they have twisted and curled like currents in a river mouth as the people of the region migrated, fought themselves, and were pushed about by foreign invaders from the Romans to the Russians.

Any attempt by a people to break from the status quo and form its own state with its own territory is fraught. Any attempt in the Caucasus is explosive.

Georgia's war with Armenia was followed by struggles with the Ossetians and the Abkhaz, ethnic minorities who saw themselves as distinct from Georgians as Georgians are from Russians. If the Georgians have the right to break free from Russian domination, the Ossetians and Abkhaz reasoned, we have the right to break from Georgian domination. But the Georgians wouldn't let them go. The vicious fighting that followed weakened the new Georgian state, contributing to the victory of the Bolshevik army that invaded in 1921.
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Not so neat and tidy, is it? And the complexity only deepened during the Soviet years.

Abkhazia, which had been an "autonomous province" within the newly independent Georgia, was made its own Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union. That lasted until 1931, when Abkhazia became an "autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. South Ossetia had a similar status.

This fiddling with borders was the work of Josef Stalin. Himself a Georgian, Stalin had a keen understanding of national passions and he drew borders and moved populations in ways calculated to create ethnic conflict and thereby strengthen Moscow's control.

As that control finally faded in 1991, Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union. But neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia wanted to go -- both resented Georgian dominance and feared they would lose autonomy within an independent Georgia -- and so they sought to become Soviet republics.

Fierce fighting broke out. Thousands died. Tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed.

Georgia failed to take control of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia but the international community decided the Soviet borders set by Stalin in the 1930s would stand. And so two "frozen conflicts" were created: Georgian sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia was internationally recognized but effective control was held by the Abkhaz, South Ossetians and their Russian allies.

The war this month was sparked by a Georgian attempt to resume control of South Ossetia. The massive Russian response and subsequent ceasefire essentially ensured everything will go back into limbo.

It all makes the head spin. And bear in mind that this is a greatly simplified version of the conflict. Add all the relevant details and it begins to resemble Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the interminable legal battle in Dickens' Bleak House.

Unfortunately, the mess in Georgia is far from unique. Similar conflicts pepper the valleys of the Caucasus. And not only there. Moldova. Somalia. Nigeria. It's only on maps that the earth is neatly divided into clear, uncontested states.

In settling these disputes, the international community is guided by two powerful principles.
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One is the inviolability of borders. Order is a precarious thing. Recognize one breakaway and others will seek the same status, nations rightly fear. The status quo must be respected.

But then there's the right of a people to "self-determination." Now enshrined in international law and the United Nations charter, the first modern declaration of this right was found in the "Fourteen Points" that American president Woodrow Wilson laid out as the basis for a post-First World War peace settlement. Wilson's words inspired countless minorities to assert themselves -- minorities that included Georgians, Abkhaz, and Ossetians.

Obviously, these two international principles push in very different directions, but they're not necessarily irreconcilable. Over the decades, a large body of law, research and precedent has developed that can help us understand when maps may legitimately be re-drawn -- and when governments are entitled to use force against those who seek to re-draw them.

And yet, we heard almost nothing about the law, research, and precedents from politicians, commentators, and the media. Faced with bewildering complexity and their own ignorance -- honestly, how many of us had even heard of South Ossetia in July? -- they turned to the comfortingly familiar tropes of the Cold War. "We've seen this movie before, in Prague and Budapest," John McCain said, referring to the Soviet invasions of 1968 and 1956, before grandly adding: "We are all Georgians."

The Russian government insisted NATO's support of Kosovo and Kosovo's recent declaration of independence from Serbia were precedents for its actions. But few gave the point any serious examination. Why complicate such a satisfying morality play?

Please note: I am not taking sides. I am not denying the machinations of Vladimir Putin. I am not denying the brutality of the Russian invasion.

What I object to are Cold War caricatures and anti-Russian sentiment so crude it verges on bigotry.

Reality anywhere is complicated. And reality in the Caucasus? Only deluded foreigners would see anything neat and tidy about it.

You can contact Dan Gardner at the Ottawa Citizen.
E-mail: dgardner@thecitizen.canwest.com

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